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Abstract
One of the four priorities of the European Commission in its prepa-
ration for the European Agenda on Migration was to open up “new 
legal migration channels, including the revision of the ‘Blue Card’ 
Directive”. This comes after only three years of full implementa-
tion of this EU immigration policy instrument (and not even that 
for some Member States). Meanwhile, in its 2014 Communication 
on the implementation of the Blue Card Directive, the European 
Commission had decided not to propose any amendment. However, 
it should not be forgotten that the Blue Card Directive was not 
designed primarily for the labour market needs of the EU. Rather, it 
was run to enhance European competitiveness by attracting highly-
qualified third-country nationals, and this under quite restrictive 
conditions of salary and qualifications. As a result there have been 
only low numbers of beneficiaries to date: 19,000 in 2012 and 2013 
for the whole EU. To develop the Blue Card Directive into a true 
highly-skilled labour-migration management tool able to respond 
to current and future labour market needs in Europe, would mean 
changes in scope, conditions and implementation modalities by 
Member States.
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“The Lisbon European Council, held in March 2000, 
set an ambitious objective for the European Union 
of “becoming the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable 
of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010”. In 
this framework, it took almost ten years for Euro-
pean institutions to adopt the Blue Card Directive 
in 20091.  The Directive was intended to foster the 
admission and mobility of highly-qualified third-
country nationals in order to make the Community 
more attractive and to sustain its competitiveness 
and economic growth. The adoption of the Directive 
by the European Council was followed by its trans-
position by the EU Member States into their national 
legislation, due to be completed by 19 June, 2011. 
The long period required for its elaboration and the 
ongoing revision undertaken after only three years 
of full implementation is evidence of the political 
sensitiveness of EU initiatives in the field of migra-
tion. It is also proof of the difficulties of establishing 
an EU-wide labour migration scheme in an institu-
tional context where legal migration competences 
still lie to a large extent with Member States. The 
limited use of the Directive, meanwhile, was revealed 
by the first review of its implementation carried out 
by the European Commission in May 20142.  The 
mandate given to the new Commissioner for Migra-
tion, Home Affairs and Citizenship for “promoting 
a new European policy on regular migration to help 
the EU address skill shortages inter alia by reviewing 
the ‘Blue Card’ legislation” and the adoption of the 
European Agenda on Migration, provide a unique 
opportunity to reassess the current EU toolkit in the 
field of legal migration. They also allow for compre-
hensive reform of the Blue Card and other instru-
ments. However, it should not be forgotten that, 
in origin, the Blue Card was primarily designed to 
enhance EU’s competitiveness (see, for instance, 
points 3-4 of the Preamble of the Directive), and 
only subsidiarily to meet EU labour market needs 
(point 5) 3. 
Therefore, to turn it into an effective labour migra-
tion tool, Blue Card reform should focus on and 
target the specific highly-qualified labour needs of 
the EU labour markets. A recent European Commis-
sion report4  identifies the top 20 “bottleneck occu-
pations” where vacancies were hard to fill in each of 
the Member States and across the European Union. 
This report shows that only ten of the top bottle-
neck occupations at EU level were actually “highly-
skilled” occupations (see Table 1)5 .
On the other hand, data on the highly-qualified 
labour market in Europe also points to the very 
different situation in different Member States: 
1 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0050. 
 2 Communication from the Commission COM(2014)287 final on the implementation of the Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 
May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com% 282014%290287_/com_com%282014%290287_
en.pdf. 
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3 Whether a scheme such as the Blue Card is apt to achieve this objective or not is subject to discussion, in part because 
its very generic definition of “highly-qualified”. In principle, it would be more effective if clearly targeted to the science, tech-
nology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates, as is the case, for example, with the US H1B visa, or other specific 
professional profiles required in the EU labour market (see Alessandra Venturini, Fabio Montobbio and Claudio Fassio (2012), 
Are migrants spurring innovation?, MPC Research Report 2012/11, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC%202012%20EN%2011.pdf).
4 European Commission (2014), Mapping and Analysing Bottleneck Vacancies in EU Labour Markets. Overview Re-
port final,
5  Ibid. pp. 33-34.
whereas graduate unemployment exceeds 8% in 
Southern Member States such as Greece, Cyprus, 
Croatia, Portugal and Italy, it is almost frictional in 
most North European countries and others beside: 
in Malta, Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, the 
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Lith-
uania and Austria it is under 4% (see Figure 1). 
This means that Blue Card reform needs to take 
into account the potential intra-EU mobility of EU 
nationals with the qualifications required by the 
bottleneck occupations in other Member States’ 
labour markets, in accordance with the principle of 
European preference. At the same time, the discrep-
ancy between member states justifies the existence of 
different national highly-qualified labour migration 
schemes to cater for those different labour market 
needs.
Table 1. Top bottleneck vacancies in the EU labour market (ISCO 4-digit level)
1 5120  Cooks 17
2 7223 Metal working machine tool setters and operators  9
3 5223 Shop sales assistants     6
4 2221 Nursing professionals     10
5 8332 Heavy truck and lorry drivers    8
6 7212 Welders and flamecutters    10
7 2144 Mechanical engineers    9
8 2512 Software developers    9
9 2212 Specialist medical practitioners    10
10 7115 Carpenters and joiners     11
11 3322 Commercial sales representatives   6
12 2151 Electrical engineers    8
13 5131 Waiters       7
14 2142 Civil engineers     6
15 2511 Systems analysts     7
16 2341 Primary school teachers    6
17 7126 Plumbers and pipe fitters    8
18 2411 Accountants     7
19 7411 Building and related electricians   6
20 5321 Health care assistants    3
Note: The highly-qualified occupations are highlighted in blue. 
Source: European Commission (2014), Mapping and Analysing Bottleneck Vacancies in EU Labour Markets. Overview Report final
Rank  ISCO code and description Number of countries reporting bottleneck vacancy
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Features and Implementation of the Blue Card
The general principles established for the implemen-
tation of the Blue Card in the Directive itself (point 7 
of the Preamble) are as follows: 
• a “fast-track admission procedure”; this 
translates into Member States being obliged to 
adopt a decision on Blue Card applications as soon 
as possible and at the latest within 90 days (some 
Member States have established shorter periods); 
however, the overwork of immigration services 
caused by the recent increase in asylum applications 
is causing some delays in Blue Card processing;
• granting beneficiaries of the Blue Card “equal 
social and economic” rights as nationals of the host 
Member State; however, as far as access to the labour 
market is concerned this only applies after the first 
two years of legal employment in the Member State 
that granted the Blue Card; during these two years, 
even changes in employer within the same country 
are subject to written authorisation in writing of the 
authorities of the granting Member State. 
• taking into account “the priorities, labour 
market needs and reception capacities of the Member 
States” and respecting the principle of Community 
preference.
The conditions for the admission and mobility of 
third-country nationals (TCN) and their family 
members for the purpose of highly qualified employ-
ment in the EU established in the Blue Card Direc-
tive can be summarized as follows. 
The applicant for a Blue Card (i.e., the prospective 
migrant employee) has to present:
• a valid work contract or a binding job offer 
for highly-qualified employment with a duration of 
at least one year offering gross annual salary which 
is not inferior to an established threshold (according 
to the Directive, a minimum 1.5 of average gross 
Figure 1. Unemployment among workers with tertiary education in EU Member States
Source: Eurostat, Unemployment statistics, 2014
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annual salary in the relevant Member State); this 
makes the Blue Card a demand driven instrument, 
based and dependent on the job offers of employers;
• a proof of relevant higher professional quali-
fications in the occupation or sector specified in 
the work contract or in the binding job offer; this is 
generally an upper university degree (see point 9 of 
the Preamble of the Directive).
• a valid travel document (but this is a mere 
formality, since Member States are supposed to grant 
a visa after a positive decision on the Blue Card 
applications).
The Directive defines a set of rights and privileges 
granted to Blue Card holders (and some limitations). 
However, practical implementation by Member 
States has effectively contributed to reducing the 
actual scope of those rights, and hence of the Blue 
Card’s added value to holders:
• The period of validity of the Blue Card is to 
be determined by Member States but the limits are 
one to four years. If the contract duration is shorter, 
the Blue Card will be valid for the duration of the 
contract plus three months, giving the beneficiary 
time to look for another job. Unemployment is only 
a cause for withdrawing the Blue Card if it lasts for 
more than three months or if it occurs more than 
once during its period of validity. However, the 
majority of Member States also retain the possibility 
of withdrawing (or not renewing) the EU Blue Card 
if the individual does not have sufficient financial 
resources to maintain themselves and the members 
of their family.
• Access to the labour market in other 
Member States. As any legal resident in the EU, Blue 
Card holders are entitled to free circulation and to 
stay in any EU Member State for up to three months. 
But in order to be able to work legally in another 
Member State, the holder has to wait for the first 18 
months of residence in the Member State which first 
granted the Blue Card and present another applica-
tion for a Blue Card in the new Member State, subject 
to the same legal procedure as any other Blue Card 
given in that State (article 18 of the Directive)6 . This 
limitation is fundamental in assessing the Blue Card 
scheme, since free access to the EU labour market 
is the key element in having a EU-wide legal migra-
tion instrument, and as it is regulated it actually 
means that a third country national wanting to work 
in several countries (even in the framework of a 
multi-country project, for instance) has to apply for 
as many blue cards as countries. In fact, obtaining a 
Blue Card does not automatically entitle him or her 
to access other Member States labour markets. 
In this sense, this provision deprives the Blue Card of 
most of its added value in relation to national admis-
sion schemes for highly-qualified third-country 
nationals. 
• Family reunification. One of the distinct 
advantages of the Blue Card is that it stipulates the 
possibility of family unification for the relatives of 
Blue Card holders. The Directive states that the resi-
dence permits for family members shall be granted, 
whenever the conditions for family reunification are 
fulfilled, within six months from the date on which 
the application was lodged. However, during 2012 
only 1,107 permits for family members of Blue Card 
holders were granted, and in 2013 in Germany, out 
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of the 14,197 Blue Cards granted, only 1,421 spouses 
and 899 children joined the beneficiaries7. This 
limited number might be explained by the relatively 
young age of Blue Card applicants (75% of them 
were under 35 in Germany). But there is increasing 
anecdotal evidence for bureaucratic obstacles and 
long procedures. These have prevented the effective 
exercise of this right by Blue Card holders.
In its Communication on the implementation of 
the Blue Card Directive, the Commission reviewed 
transposition by Member States, which is virtu-
ally complete. But data on numbers of Blue Cards 
granted indicate that this scheme is far from having 
established itself as a legal migration instrument at 
the EU-level. Indeed, the official statistics provided 
by Eurostat and relayed by the European Commis-
sion in its Communication8 indicate that the 
number of the Blue Cards issued has been limited 
so far: during 2012 and 2013 the total number did 
not reach 19,000, out of which more than 14,000 
were issued by Germany (89%), which had no effec-
tive alternative national scheme for highly-qualified 
migrants. Just over 300 renewed during those years 
(see Figure 2).
However, these low figures have to be interpreted 
in the light of the limited number of work permits 
granted through national schemes for highly-qual-
ified employment as well. These have remained in 
force and have coexisted with the Blue Card Direc-
tive in seventeen Member States (in six of them 
with specific schemes for highly qualified migrants). 
Those national schemes were developed to meet 
the specific needs of national labour markets and 
are implemented through point-based, employer-
led or demand driven systems. The Commission 
Communication on the implementation of the Blue 
Card suggested that the existence of those national 
schemes might explain the low number of Blue 
Cards issued by Member States. In any case, between 
2008 and 2012, work permits granted though such 
national schemes stood at, on average, 17,500 
permits, against the 15,261 Blue Cards granted in 
2013. In both cases these are quite low numbers in 
relation to the size of the EU labour market9 . 
This low level of use of the Directive is thus common 
to the Blue Card scheme and the highly-qualified 
national migration schemes. Both EU and national 
6 Of course, this possibility is excluded for the Member States who “opted out” and do not apply the EU Directive, i.e. 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
7 Communication from the Commission COM(2014)287 final, ibid.
8  It is significant that only data for 2012 and 2013 are available as for April 2015.
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9 See Communication COM(2014)287 final, p. 13. For a review of the implementation of the Blue Card by groups 
of Member States, see Anna Triandafyllidou and Irina Isaakyan (2014), EU Management of High Skill Migration, Global 
Governance Programme Policy Brief, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute,http://
cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/34706.
Source: Eurostat, EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1]
systems combined remain marginal in relation to 
the total number of first residence permits issued 
for employment (remunerated activities) reasons 
in the EU, that according to Eurostat amounted to 
535,475 (only 22.7% of the total number of first resi-
dence permits issued) in 2013. This might indicate a 
dysfunctionality in those schemes as they are imple-
mented today to meet the demand for qualified labour 
in EU labour markets.
Another reason that might explain those lacklustre 
results is the high level of heterogeneity in the trans-
position and implementation of the Directive in 
national legislation: this is, of course, at odds with the 
very purpose of the Blue Card, which was to create a 
harmonized if not single legal framework regulating 
admission and residence of highly-qualified third-
country nationals. This diversity has its origin in the 
many safeguards and margins of flexibility offered 
by the Directive in order to accommodate the objec-
Figure 2. Number of Blue Cards issued during 2012-2013
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tions and resistance of many Member States. Indeed, 
the Blue Card Directive was a minimum common 
denominator compromise which as such threat-
ened the prospects of a common legal framework for 
highly-skilled migration management. This hetero-
geneity undermines the potential of the EU Blue 
Card much more than its coexistence with national 
schemes.
Finally, the assessment of the implementation of the 
Blue Card Directive should take into account that 
Blue Card related procedures are extremely costly 
for all stakeholders. It is “costly” for the applicant 
through cumbersome bureaucracy. But the proce-
dure is costly as well for national authorities, because 
it requires case-by-case processing for which these 
authorities are often not prepared: a system of certi-
fied employers or trusted partners entitled to obtain 
Blue Cards for their third-country employees through 
a much lighter procedure, as is applied in the national 
scheme of the Netherlands, might solve this problem. 
Finally, the Blue Card is costly for the employer as 
well due to the one-year minimum contract duration 
(whereas often national labour law establishes three to 
six months probationary periods) and the minimum 
salary threshold. The minimum salary threshold of 
1.5 of average gross annual salary in the Member State 
concerned can be reduced to 1.2 by Member States 
for employment in professions which are in particular 
need of migrant workers. It aims to prevent the under-
mining of the work conditions of those employed. 
However, it seems that these minimum thresholds are 
not respected in many Member Stares10 . It must also 
be said that national salaries vary significantly across 
sectors, occupations and regions and the established 
single national threshold might not correspond to the 
competitive salary for a particular sector or occupa-
tion in a given place. This clearly discriminates against 
low-added value sectors and small and medium 
companies, which may need highly-qualified migrant 
labour but face obstacles in benefitting from the Blue 
Card Directive. 
This argument is confirmed by the profile of EU Blue 
Card beneficiaries. Figure 3 presents the distribution 
of Blue Cards by occupation. It clearly indicates that 
the professional characteristics of applicants are quite 
diverse, even if manager-type occupations prevail. 
The current definition of “highly-qualified” deter-
mined through evidence of higher-education quali-
fications (ISCED categories 5a and 6) or at least five 
years of professional experience of a level comparable 
to higher education qualifications may be too limited. 
We say this in as much as the definition excludes 
highly- or even medium-skilled professionals with 
vocational education and training degrees: yet these 
may also be badly needed by the EU labour market.
How to Reform the Blue Card Directive and to What 
End?
There is a wide consensus that the EU needs to improve 
its channels for legal migration to meet its labour 
market needs, in particular for qualified workers. 
And the Blue Card, as an innovative tool to attract 
this specific category of migrants through a common 
regime for the whole EU, has an important role to play 
in this framework. Its demand-driven approach is also 
appropriate for a labour market with such high levels 
of unemployment among qualified workers in some 
Member States (see Figure 1 above) and a compre-
hensive system of welfare benefits. In Europe, a point 
or “expression of interest” system which would not 
be limited to candidates having a concrete job offer 
would risk increasing the pool of unemployed gradu-
ates and displace EU nationals against the EU pref-
erence principle, substituting for intra-Community 
labour mobility. In the absence of a comprehensive 
welfare system for unemployed workers, the adjust-
ment in the labour market usually happens through 
the acceptance of jobs and occupations under their 
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level of qualification by national or migrant qualified 
workers. This is often the case in countries imple-
menting a point system such as Canada or the UK 
and leads to high levels of underutilisation of skills 
of migrants. But in Europe this might actually lead to 
more graduate unemployment and a heavier burden 
for the welfare state.
However, the EU Blue Card system does not respond, 
at least as it is presently configured, to the EU’s 
needs for highly-qualified labour. It is too costly for 
all parties involved (employers, beneficiary migrant 
workers and implementing States), it does not provide 
sufficient additional rights to make it attractive for 
potential beneficiaries (in terms of free access to the 
labour market of other EU Member States, right to 
family reunification or prospects of getting a perma-
nent residence permit in the EU) and it does not 
ensure real added value in relation to highly-quali-
fied national migration schemes. This is reflected in 
the low numbers of applications and the low number 
of blue cards granted. As a labour migration instru-
ment, it seems to be limited in practice to one country, 
Germany (which had lacked a legal migration scheme 
for highly-qualified third-country nationals and has a 
Source: Eurostat, EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1] 
Note: The figure includes only the Blue Cards for which occupation is reported. For the majority of cases (12.483) the occupa-
tion is unknown.
10 According to the information provided by the European Commission (page 6 and Table 4 of COM(2014)287 final), 
national transposition of the minimum threshold varies significantly, and at least ten Member States established thresholds 
below the one prescribed by Article 5.3 of the Directive, that is 1.5.
Figure 3 : EU Blue Cards by occupation 2012-2013
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well-identified need for university graduate workers), 
and to multinational companies with a European 
reach: small and medium companies are largely 
excluded because of the high cost, though there is no 
data on the distribution of Blue Cards across employer 
company types.
Actually, many of the provisions of the Blue Card 
Directive, and the way transposition into national 
legislations was conceived, are geared to restrict 
the number of beneficiaries rather than to facili-
tate the matching between EU labour demand and 
international skilled workers. As such, they tend to 
discourage talented workers rather than attracting 
them, in particular if these workers have alternatives. 
In this context, for the Blue Card to become a true 
EU-wide labour migration instrument, some key 
policy reforms are outlined below:
- One Blue Card giving access to the whole EU 
labour market. Without encroaching into Member 
States competences, the Blue Card should revert to 
the original idea of one umbrella work permit for 
the whole EU: i.e., a single permit allowing for free 
movement and the right of establishment within the 
EU labour market. Here lies the main added value of 
having a highly-skilled EU labour migration instru-
ment (see point 25 of the Preamble of the Direc-
tive), and hence its justification. Access to the labour 
market of other Member States should be automati-
cally guaranteed for beneficiaries of the Blue Card, 
after a qualifying period of one year in the job for 
which the Blue Card was granted (instead of the 
current two years, which is too long). There should 
be no need for another administrative procedure to 
apply for it. This requires a higher level of harmoni-
zation (and maybe simplification) of Member States 
implementing rules as the one resulting from the Blue 
Card Directive transposition, which has in fact led 
to multiple national Blue Card systems instead of a 
single one. This would be the only way to grant bene-
ficiaries of the Blue Card “equal social and economic 
rights as nationals of the host Member State”, as stated 
in point 7 of the Preamble of the Directive. There is no 
reason why this would cause “prejudice to the right of 
the Member States to determine the volume of admis-
sion of third-country nationals entering their terri-
tory for the purposes of highly qualified employment” 
(point 8 of the Preamble). It would not, then, require a 
change in the current distribution of competences.
- EU Blue Card and national labour migra-
tion schemes can coexist without any dysfunction. 
If the objective is to develop a flexible system that is 
responsive to national and EU labour market needs as 
they emerge, the coexistence of several systems is not 
detrimental to the overall objective. Economic actors 
will seek in each case the scheme best adapted to 
their needs. It might be assumed that the existence of 
numerous national schemes would lead to confusion 
among potential employers or migrant employees. 
However, national schemes might be more flexible 
and dynamic in meeting the needs of national labour 
markets. What is needed is, rather, more transparent, 
comprehensive and widely available information on 
the conditions for benefitting from a Blue Card in 
each of the Member States. The current information 
on application procedures provided by the Euro-
pean Immigration Portal and national immigration 
authorities on conditions, procedures, rights and 
other features of the Blue Card is poor. It is not up 
to the job of guiding potential applicants through the 
bureaucratic procedures required to obtain it.
- The cost of benefitting from the Blue Card 
should be reduced. The high salary threshold estab-
lished (minimum of 1.5 of the average national salary, 
even if not all Member States respect this minimum) 
can only result in a limitation of the Blue Card to very 
specific cases (such as multinational companies). As 
such it will reduce its effectiveness as a labour migra-
tion tool (in particular, for small and medium enter-
prises). It also penalizes those sectors with lower 
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than average salaries in the economy. In order to 
make sure that labour immigration does not under-
mine national work conditions and salaries, the only 
required threshold is that of the collective bargaining 
or average salary applicable in each sector. At the very 
least, the salary threshold should be made sectorial 
or occupation specific so it can better adapt to the 
different needs of national labour markets.
- Rights attached to the Blue Card should be 
enhanced. Family reunification for the relatives of 
Blue Card beneficiaries – one of the main advantages 
of the Blue Card in relation to national systems – 
should be granted at the same time that the Blue Card 
is given. On the other hand, the maximum period 
for granting the Blue Card should be extended to five 
years that would entitle beneficiaries to a permanent 
residence permit according to EU legislation. In a 
labour market context where highly-skilled labour 
migration needs in Europe seem largely long term, it 
does not make sense to approach the Blue Card as a 
purely temporary work permit.
- Finally, a more flexible and in particular 
more targeted definition of “highly-qualified” inte-
grating specialized professionals in highly sought-
after occupations would contribute to approach 
the EU Blue Card to the needs of the EU labour 
market. The analysis of EU labour markets shows that 
migrant labour needs do not target graduate workers 
at large(who have high levels of unemployment in 
several Member States, in particular in Southern 
Europe). They regardvery specific highly-skilled 
occupational profiles, and the Blue Card should be 
geared to those needs.
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